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Privatization, Public R&D Policy, and Private R&D
Investment in China’s Agriculture
Ruifa Hu, Qin Liang, Carl Pray, Jikun Huang, and Yanhong Jin
Private R&D is a major source of innovation and productivity growth in agriculture worldwide.
This paper examines trends and determinants of agricultural R&D in China. Results show that
while the public sector monopolized agricultural research until recently, private agricultural R&D
has grown rapidly since 2000, driven largely by agribusiness privatization. Public-sector R&D
investments in basic research also encouraged private R&D research, but public investments in
technology development crowded out private R&D investment. China’s private R&D investment
wouldgrowmorerapidlyifthegovernmentshiftedpublicresourcesfromtechnologydevelopment
to basic research.
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Introduction
In OECD countries, private-sector research and development (R&D) is a major source of innovation
and productivity growth; private companies now conduct half of all agricultural R&D (Pardey,
Beintema, and Dehmer, 2006) and account for much of the increase in crop and livestock
productivity in the United States (Huffman and Evenson, 2006) and elsewhere. Studies in India
have shown that the private sector in developing countries can also play a key role in agricultural
innovationandproductivitygrowth,eventhoughprivateresearchindevelopingcountriesiscurrently
limited (Evenson, Pray, and Rosegrant, 1999; Ramaswami, Pray, and Kelly, 1979).
The public sector is the primary provider of agricultural R&D in developing countries as well as
the major source of new agricultural technology. The most recent data on government investments
in R&D show a divergence among different countries and regions of the world. A few large and
rapidly-growing countries–China, Brazil, and India–are making major investments in agricultural
R&D, while public agricultural R&D is stagnant or declining in much of the rest of the world
(Beintema and Stads, 2010).
Many countries appear to rely on the private sector to play a greater role in generating and
transferring agricultural technology as government participation declines. This increase in reliance
on the private sector often requires commensurate improvements in intellectual property rights,
business incubation, and tax incentives to encourage R&D investments . Unfortunately, little data
exist to test the nature of the relationship between public and private research expenditures and
determine the best policies forstimulating private research. This article uses a unique data set on
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agricultural R&D expenditures by private ﬁrms to test the impact of public sector agricultural R&D
and incentive programs on private sector R&D expenditures.
Past studies of private research in China have argued that private-sector R&D in developing
countries is constrained by weak intellectual property rights (IPR), government control of
agricultural input markets, and policies limiting foreign investment in agriculture (Pray and Fuglie,
2002; Pray, 2002). More recent studies suggest that public sector research may be crowding out
private R&D. One study reported that China’s public agricultural research system (PARS) conducts
most of the applied research from which commercial ﬁrms could earn proﬁts (Huang, Hu, and
Rozelle, 2003). Further, in recent interviews, executives and owners of major Chinese seed and
biotechnology companies stated that public-sector plant breeding research dominates and limits
growthintheprivatesector,despiterecentincreasesinprivate-sectorR&D(Personalcommunication
with ﬁve Chinese-owned ﬁrms in Beijing, August 2009).
In the 1990s, the Chinese government recognized the potential value of private investments in
agricultural research and innovation and implemented several policies to encourage private R&D.
These policies included reforming China’s public R&D system, increasing public R&D investment,
liberalizing agricultural input markets, and encouraging private R&D through measures such as
government ﬁnancing of private R&D, tax incentives, and strengthening intellectual property rights.
This paper examines investments in private agricultural research and development (R&D) in
China by examining three questions:
1. Have investments in private agricultural R&D increased in China?
2. Have recent policy changes, particularly public R&D investments and input market
liberalization, induced more private R&D investment?
3. What are the implications for future research policy in China?
Changes in Agricultural Research Policies and Institutions in China
In the last 40 years, China has outpaced other developing countries in investments in and the
expansion of agricultural research personnel and research expenditures (Fan and Pardey, 1997).
However, agricultural research in China remains institutionally and geographically fragmented (Fan
and Pardey, 1997). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Chinese government gradually allowed
the private sector to play a major role in agricultural input and output markets, but most research
remained the province of the public sector (Huang, Hu, and Rozelle, 2003).
Since the mid-1990s, Chinese leaders have encouraged and supported private R&D investment
by implementing three types of policies. The ﬁrst provided incentives to public research institutes
to increase basic research and privatized some public research institutes that conducted applied
research. This shift in public research focus to basic research aimed at stimulating private-sector
innovation. The second liberalized input markets and enacted speciﬁc laws allowing the private
sector to conduct research. The third strengthened IPRs and provided speciﬁc subsidies and tax
incentives for private companies conducting R&D.
Reforms in China’s agricultural research system have occurred in two distinct phases. In the
ﬁrst phase, from the mid 1980s to early 1990s, policies were meant to increase funding for and
improve efﬁciency of public agricultural R&D with the ultimate goal of maintaining and enhancing
competitiveness in the agricultural sector. In addition, these reforms were intended to accelerate
technology transfer from the public research system to technology users such as farmers (Huang
etal.,2000;Huang,Hu,andRozelle,2003;Koo,Pardey,andQian,2007).Speciﬁcpolicieswerealso
implemented to shift the mechanism of research funding from centralized institutional distribution
to a less well-funded competitive grants system and to encourage institutes to make up the difference
by commercializing their research products (Huang et al., 2000; Huang, Hu, and Rozelle, 2003; Koo,
Pardey, and Qian, 2007). However, Huang et al. (2000); Huang, Hu, and Rozelle (2003) reported that418 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
funding gains generated from commercial activities did not offset declines in government research
support. Income generated from commercial activities also declined after the early 1990s.
The second phase of reforms, in the late 1990s, was designed to encourage and stimulate private
research in China’s agricultural research system. In particular, public institutes, especially those
conducting applied research and with technologies sufﬁciently proﬁtable to pay research costs,
were encouraged to commercialize their research or technologies (Koo, Pardey, and Qian, 2007).
The private sector was also encouraged to take on a greater role in applied research. In this phase,
various private research institutes emerged, including commercial ﬁrms owned by public research
institutes and other government agencies, agribusiness ﬁrms owned by other government agencies,
and companies privately held by individuals or listed on stock markets.1
However, public research institutes still formed the backbone of China’s agricultural research
system. For example, institutes focusing on applied and basic research with a strong public goods
nature (such as those analyzing genomes of important crops and breeding new varieties of self-
pollinated crops) were maintained in the public “research innovation base” (Huang, Hu, and Rozelle,
2003). By the end of 2002, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) oversaw sixty-six agricultural
research institutes in the three Academies (Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science, CAAS;
Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences, CAFS, and Chinese Academy of Tropical Agricultural
Science, CATAS). Among these agricultural research institutes, approximately half (thirty-three
institutes) were maintained as public research institutes, twenty-two were commercialized, four
were merged with universities, and eleven reformed as quasi-public institutes. In addition, each
province and many lower-level governmental bodies supported agricultural research academies.
Many provinces reformed their agricultural research academies in a manner similar to the reforms
in the MOA institutes, but others did not. As a result, the sample of private ﬁrms used in this study
includes ﬁrms that were once part of government research institutes.
One thing is clear: public applied and basic research budgets have grown dramatically since
the second reform phase. Table 1 reports the research budgets of public agricultural research
organizations. The ﬁscal allocation consists of government funds allocated to public research
organizations for institutional support such as salaries, operating and maintenance of labs and
experiment stations, and competitive grants for the variable costs of research projects. Commercial
income is revenue earned through commercial activities conducted by research organizations. Some
of these funds pay for the expenses of commercial operations while some support research; however,
no data are available to indicate how much funding from commercial operations goes to research.
From 1995 to 2000, total budgets for agricultural research in real terms grew by only 1.3%, largely
because revenue from commercial activities declined. However, public-sector funding began to
accelerate during this period. Since 2000, in real terms, total budgets for agricultural research have
increased by more than 10% a year, driven by an almost 15% annual rate of growth in government
contributions.
Ofﬁcial data provide mixed signals on whether the latest set of reforms actually focused public
research on the production of public goods rather than technology development. The decline in
commercial income obtained by public institutes since 1995, shown in table 1, suggests that some
applied research and commercial activities may have been spun off to the private sector. Table 2
reports project-based research funding, which excludes non-project based budgets (e.g., salaries,
regular operation costs, costs of constructing research facilities, and institutional support), divided
into research and development expenditure.2 This is the only data available which disaggregates
governmentR&Dintothesetwocategories;wedesignatethesecategoriesaspublicresearch(Public-
1 In this paper we include all these types of companies as private sector. because even the government-owned enterprises
included here operate as private companies with little interference from their government owners. In this paper–as in China–
commercial and private and commercialized and privatized are used as synonyms.
2 Research project based funding data are from all government agricultural research institutes (about 1100) supervised by
the Ministry of Agriculture at national, provincial, and prefecture levels. Funding for research projects is classiﬁed as basic
research, basic-applied research, experiment and development, application of research and experiment outcome, sciences and
technology service, and production activities.Hu, et al. R&D Investment in China’s Agriculture 419
Table 1. Total Income for Public Agricultural Research in China in 1991-2006 (Billion Yuan)








1991 2.85 1.80 1.05 6.47 4.08 2.39
1992 3.66 2.10 1.56 7.90 4.53 3.37
1993 4.16 2.23 1.92 8.25 4.44 3.81
1994 5.27 2.95 2.32 9.02 5.05 3.97
1995 5.89 3.26 2.64 8.06 4.45 3.61
1996 6.41 3.54 2.87 7.50 4.14 3.36
1997 6.15 4.10 2.05 6.62 4.42 2.20
1998 6.85 4.40 2.45 7.15 4.59 2.56
1999 7.51 4.85 2.67 7.89 5.09 2.80
2000 7.90 5.32 2.58 8.41 5.66 2.75
2001 8.18 5.72 2.46 8.63 6.04 2.60
2002 10.50 7.72 2.78 11.01 8.09 2.92
2003 11.81 8.81 3.00 12.50 9.33 3.18
2004 11.65 9.34 2.31 12.23 9.80 2.42
2005 13.12 10.92 2.21 13.33 11.09 2.24
2006 15.47 12.83 2.65 15.47 12.83 2.65
Annual growth ratea
1991-1995 19.9 16.4 25.0 5.9 2.9 10.4
1995-2000 6.0 10.4 -0.4 1.3 5.5 -4.9
2000-2006 11.6 15.9 -1.2 10.5 14.8 -2.1
1991-2006 10.3 13.4 3.4 44.6 7.6 -1.9
Notes: a Annual growth rates are estimated by regression methods based on data from the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST,
various issues), which includes agricultural research conducted in public research institutes and universities. The deﬂator used to calculate the
real values is Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) (2007).
R) and public development (Public-D), which we believe reﬂects the allocation of scientists and
R&D capital resources.3 Both agricultural Public-R and Public-D grew rapidly after the mid 1990s.
However, in contrast to the government’s declared objective, Public-R expanded in the 1990s
and then declined when the second phase of agricultural research reforms began in late 1990s.
Although Public-R began to recover in 2001, by 2006 it was still only 18% of total agricultural
R&D investment (column 4, table 2).
The second major set of policy changes that may have encouraged private-sector R&D involved
the privatization of agricultural input markets and the food industry. Commercial enterprises were
allowed to enter the livestock, ﬁsheries, crop, and food industries in the late 1980s, during the ﬁrst
3 Public-R includes basic and basic-applied researches and Public-D includes all other projects. The distinction between
Public-R and Public-D differs from the classiﬁcation by the Frascati Manual (). The Frascati Manual classiﬁes R&D research
activities into three categories, basic research, applied research and experimental research. “Basic research is experimental or
theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundations of phenomena and observable
facts, without any particular application or use in view” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
p. 77). “Applied research is original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge. It is, however, directed
primarily towards a speciﬁc practical aim or objective” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
p. 78). “Experimental development is systematic work, drawing on knowledge gained from research and practical experience,
that is directed to producing new materials, products and devices; to installing new processes, systems, and services, or to
improving substantially those already produced or installed” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), p. 79). To a great extent, the public-R represents both basic and applied research in the Frascati Manual; and the
public-D is similar as experimental development deﬁned in the Frascati Manual.420 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Table 2. Project Based Funding of Public Agricultural Research Institutes under MOA
System in 1991-2006 (Billion Yuan)
Current price At 2006 constant price
Year Total Public-R Public-D Share of
Public-R Total Public-R Public-D
1991 0.26 0.03 0.23 13 0.55 0.07 0.49
1992 0.30 0.05 0.25 16 0.58 0.09 0.49
1993 0.31 0.04 0.26 13 0.53 0.07 0.45
1994 0.33 0.07 0.27 20 0.46 0.09 0.37
1995 0.37 0.08 0.30 20 0.44 0.09 0.35
1996 0.41 0.11 0.30 27 0.45 0.12 0.33
1997 0.50 0.14 0.36 28 0.54 0.15 0.39
1998 0.71 0.22 0.49 32 0.76 0.24 0.53
1999 0.71 0.19 0.52 26 0.77 0.20 0.57
2000 1.05 0.15 0.91 14 1.14 0.16 0.98
2001 1.06 0.17 0.90 16 1.15 0.18 0.96
2002 1.43 0.24 1.19 17 1.55 0.26 1.30
2003 1.49 0.28 1.21 19 1.60 0.30 1.30
2004 1.79 0.33 1.45 18 1.85 0.34 1.50
2005 2.13 0.36 1.77 17 2.16 0.36 1.80
2006 2.40 0.44 1.96 18 2.40 0.44 1.96
Annual growth ratea
1991-1995 8.5 23.1 5.9 -6.6 6.0 -8.8
1995-2000 22.8 16.8 23.9 21.2 15.3 22.3
2000-2006 15.7 20.1 14.8 14.0 18.4 13.2
1991-2006 17.3 17.8 17.2 12.5 12.9 12.4
Notes: a Annual growth rates are estimated by regression methods based on unpublished reports by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), which
record annual income, expenditure, research capacity of each agricultural research institute under MOA. The deﬂator used to calculate the real
values is Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) (2007).
phase of the agricultural research system reforms. However, markets were introduced gradually
and differed from industry to industry and province to province. In addition, as discussed above,
institutions such as public research institutes were encouraged to support themselves in the late
1980s and 1990s through commercial activities. Only after the mid 1990s did the commercial
activities of those research institutes decline (table 1).
Seedwasoneofthelastmarketsthatprivateﬁrmswereallowedtoenter.In2000,thegovernment
passed the ﬁrst seed law to legally deﬁne a role for the private sector. The law stipulates that any
entrepreneur with access to the required capital and facilities could sell seed. This legislation ended
monopoly protections for county, prefectural, and provincial seed companies. All ﬁrms–private,
quasi-commercialized state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and traditional SOEs–were allowed to apply
for permits to sell seed in any jurisdiction. Measures were also enacted that allowed some ﬁrms to
operate in any province in the country and to certify seed at the provincial level, entitling them to
sell seed in any county in the province.
In addition to the reform of the public agricultural research system and food industry
privatization, several policies were introduced to encourage additional private R&D. The
government strengthened the intellectual property rights (IPR) system, provided subsidies for
research, and reduced taxes on companies investing in agricultural R&D. China passed its ﬁrst patent
law in 1983 and began accepting patent applications in 1985. Gradually, industry coverage expandedHu, et al. R&D Investment in China’s Agriculture 421
and enforcement was strengthened. In recent years, specialized courts focusing on intellectual
property cases expanded to new regions of the country and were provided with more resources
and training. These courts now hear many more cases, and, as a result, case law governing patent
disputes has developed.
The public agricultural sector also uses patent law to protect technology. For example, the
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) has patents that protect its Bt genes (Fang et al.,
2001). However, it is unclear how successful these efforts to protect and then license public sector
innovations have been.
In 1997, China passed and implemented its ﬁrst Plant Variety Protection Act. Legislators
developed a legal framework based on International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV) guidelines. After ofﬁcially promulgating the law, China began accepting applications
for plant variety protection certiﬁcates (PVPCs) in 1999. The legislation appears to have stimulated
publicresearchinstitutesandprivateﬁrmstoincreaseinvestmentsinplantbreeding(Huetal.,2006).
Interviews by the authors with Chinese and multinational private seed and biotech ﬁrms in
2004 and 2009 indicated that, while they would like enforcement of both patents and PVPCs to
be strengthened, the current system is sufﬁciently effective to justify investing in applications for
PVPCs and patents. This is a substantial change from the 1990s, when those ﬁrms did not apply for
patents or PVPCs.
Major policies to promote private investment in R&D began after 1999. The State Council
released a policy document in 1999 outlining policy guidelines to promote China’s technology
innovation. Several policies to encourage companies to invest in R&D were included (Chinese
Central Committee of Communist Party of China and the State Countil, 1999). For example,
the government eliminated the business tax (usually 3% to 5%) on income generated from the
sale of a ﬁrm’s technology or services related to the technology and provided subsidized loans
through state banks to ﬁrms generating new technologies. Following the guidelines of the 1999
State Council document, the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation developed an
implementation plan in late 1999 and 2000 to allow tax deductions on revenues for funds that any
agency provides for R&D in research institutes and universities (Ministry of Finance (MOF), 1999).
Another policy permits companies to apply to the government for research grants. The National
Economic and Trade Committee (NETC) initiated this policy in 2000 to encourage mid- and small-
sized ﬁrms to invest in R&D. The NETC asked each level of local government to support the
development of mid- and small-sized ﬁrms by establishing risk investment foundations that would
directly invest in commercial ﬁrms’ R&D and technology commercialization efforts. The policy also
eliminated sales taxes for three years for sales of technology developed through ﬁrms’ technology
improvement projects (National Economic and Trade Commission (NETC), 2000).
Trends and Characteristics of Private Agricultural R&D
We use a unique R&D data set created by surveying more than 1000 private agribusinesses in
China to examine the characteristics of private agricultural R&D. No comparable data set has been
constructed for any other developing country. The data allow us to conduct an econometric analysis
of the impacts of public policies and investments on private agribusiness R&D, focusing on the
extent to which public research stimulates or hinders private R&D.
The data used in this study are derived from the ﬁrst nation-wide mail survey of private
agribusiness research organizations in China. Coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture, the survey
was implemented by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP) in 2007 and covered
all 31 provinces in China. Firms surveyed included all agricultural companies supervised by the
Chinese agricultural administration system except those fully owned by foreign companies and ﬁrms
supervised by non-agricultural administration systems. The latter includes some agricultural inputs
ﬁrms under different Ministries (e.g., fertilizer, insecticide, and agricultural machinery).422 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
The questionnaire collected detailed information on ﬁrms’ R&D investments, human resources,
technology transfer, and sales revenues for the years 2000, 2004, 2005 and 2006. Firm-level
data were also gathered, including information on the year the ﬁrm was established, ownership
characteristics, and industry coverage.
In each province, the local government distributed the mail survey questionnaire and collected
completed surveys from each ﬁrm. Several measures were used to improve the accuracy of the self-
reported data. First, a detailed questionnaire manual deﬁning each question in detail was provided to
the surveyed ﬁrms along with the survey. Second, researchers collaborated with local governments
to control data quality and improve response rate by calling ﬁrms regularly. In the ﬁrst round of
the survey, 24 of 31 provinces sent back questionnaires from 1293 agricultural companies. Among
provinces returning questionnaires there was an overall response rate of 54%. Of the non-responding
ﬁrms (46%) in these provinces, 5% were randomly selected for phone interviews. None of the non-
responders had any R&D activities. Third, in the remaining 7 provinces, we randomly selected 10%
(or 66) of all agricultural companies and interviewed them by mail; the response rate was 100% of 66
ﬁrms. In estimating total private R&D investment, we assume zero investment from non-responding
ﬁrms.Finally,tocheckdataqualitywealsorandomlyselected5%oftherespondingﬁrms(1293+66)
and conducted an additional phone-survey. We concluded that the survey data were quite reliable.4
We collected data on private agricultural R&D investment to obtain ﬁrms’ expenditures on
R&D activities from their own resources and funding received from government sources, including
government-sponsored contract research. This makes it possible to identify the total amount of
private ﬁrm research (private plus public funding spent by the ﬁrms) and the amount of research
funded solely by private ﬁrms. Since we are primarily concerned with research funded by each
private ﬁrm, most of the data reported and the data used as the dependent variable in the regression
analysis below is research funded by private ﬁrms. We also present the total amount of R&D
conducted by private ﬁrms in table 3. Firms are classiﬁed into ﬁve industry categories: crops
(seed, tea, silkworm, mulberry, vegetable, and fruit); livestock (pork, cattle, poultry, and veterinary);
ﬁshery; food processing (milk, grain, vegetables, fruit, meat, and other food products); and other (54
ﬁrms in machinery, fertilizer, and pesticide industries).5
Data used in estimating the models were from 1,305 ﬁrms (1293 + 66 - 54) providing a total
of 4,021 observations over four years. In 2006, each ﬁrm employed an average of 326 people, had
average sales revenues of 132 million yuan (approximately $16.5 million), and made average R&D
investments of 1.66 million yuan ($0.21 million).
Survey results indicated that private agricultural R&D investment grew rapidly from 2000 (table
3). Measured in 2006 prices, total real investment agricultural R&D performed by private ﬁrms
increased from 840 million yuan ($101 million) in 2000 to 3,504 million yuan ($438 millions) in
2006, at an average annual growth rate of 26.9% (table 3). Most R&D investment came from ﬁrms’
own funding (column 2, table 3), though the government also provided some co-funding for private
R&D (see the last column of table 3). In-house R&D funding increased from 721 million yuan
($87 million) in 2000 to 2,988 million yuan ($375 million) in 2006 (column 3, table 3). Over the
same period, outsourced contract R&D investment increased from 29 million yuan ($3.5 million)
to 264 million yuan ($3 million) (column 4, table 3). R&D growth rates were 26.8% for in-house
investments and 44.4% for outsourced investments.
4 In the follow up phone survey, we asked each of the selected ﬁrms (67) the following questions: 1) Did your ﬁrm have
R&Dexpendituresin2006?2)Ifyes,howmuchwasspentonR&Dactivitiesin2006?3)WhatwerethemajorR&Dactivities
in 2006? The same questions were then repeated in 2004. We compared the data received from the phone survey with the
data collected by the mail survey. We found that the answers for questions 1 and 3 were the same in both surveys, there was
no statistical difference in the mean of R&D expenditure (question 2), and none of 67 (above you say you interviewed 66
ﬁrms?) ﬁrms interviewed reported R&D expenditures that differed by more than 10%.
5 Although these 54 ﬁrms are supervised by the agricultural administration system, they account for only a small portion of
overall industries in machinery, fertilizer, and pesticide. We include these 54 ﬁrms when calculating total private investment,
but they were excluded in regression analysis.Hu, et al. R&D Investment in China’s Agriculture 423








Total In own Firm Contract Out
2000 840 750 721 29 90
2004 2,169 1,849 1,747 103 319
2005 2,684 2,435 2,270 165 249
2006 3,504 3,252 2,988 264 252
Annual growth rates (%)
2000-2006 26.9 27.7 26.8 44.4 18.7
Notes: Prices are for million yuan in 2006 prices. Investment in nominal values was deﬂated by consumer price index based on 2006. This
table is based on a national mail survey coordinated by MOA and implemented by CCAP in 2007.
Figure 1 presents the distribution of private R&D investment each year. In 2000, nearly half
of private ﬁrms had no R&D investment at all, but over time more ﬁrms began investing in R&D
activities. The percentage of ﬁrms with no R&D declined from 43.60% in 2000 to 28.81% in 2006.
Average private R&D investments among all ﬁrms sampled increased from 0.82 million yuan in
2000 ($0.10 million) to 1.66 million yuan ($0.20 million) in 2006. Average investment among
ﬁrms that made any investments increased from 1.54 million yuan ($0.19 million) in 2000 to 2.34
million yuan ($0.30 million). Figure 1 also suggests that private R&D investment is highly skewed,
with a small number of ﬁrms accounting for most private R&D investment. Private agricultural
R&D investment in China is heavily focused on the agricultural processing industry. In 2006, the
processing industry accounted for more than 40% of total investment, followed by livestock and
veterinary industries with around 30% in total (Figure 2), crop research with less than 20%, and
ﬁsheries with about 10%.6
Several types of ﬁrms carry out what is classiﬁed as private research in China. Table 4 shows
the types of ﬁrms, their frequency in the sample, sizes (employees and sale revenues), and research
focus. More than 1000 ﬁrms are fully privately owned; these ﬁrms are relatively small, with fewer
than 300 employees, and their research intensity averages about 1.2% of sales revenue. One hundred
andthree ﬁrmsare stillstate-ownedbut operateasprivate orcommercial ﬁrmswithlittle government
intervention.ThesearethesmallestChineseﬁrmswiththelowestresearchintensity,perhapsbecause
they depend most heavily on technology from government research institutes and on government
funding for in-house research. Some ﬁrms are classiﬁed as private co-operatives; others are joint
ventures between Chinese and international companies. There are only 73 joint venture ﬁrms, but
these ﬁrms are the largest in terms of size (almost 600 employees) and have the lowest research
intensities. A few ﬁrms, 23 in the sample, have listed stock on one of China’s stock exchanges.
These are very big ﬁrms with lower than average research intensity.
Table 5 provides summary statistics of ﬁrm characteristics. These ﬁrms were relatively young–
the average age was seven years in 2006. Average sales revenues per ﬁrm were about 132 million
yuan ($1.57 million) and exhibited large standard deviations. The bottom half of table 5 compares
ﬁrms with no R&D investment to those with at least some R&D investment. There is no signiﬁcant
difference in terms of ﬁrm ages and ownership structures. However, average sales revenues for ﬁrms
with positive R&D investments were almost triple those of ﬁrms not investing in R&D activities
(147.35 vs. 52.52 million yuan). Few private agricultural ﬁrms were publically traded in 2000, and
6 In making international comparisons it is important to note that some sectors of agricultural research such as pesticide
and some agricultural machinery research is not counted here because these types of ﬁrms are not supervised by China’s
agricultural administration system. If they were included, they would increase the share of crop-related research.424 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Figure 1. Distribution of Private R&D Investment by Year
only 10 of these ﬁrms were included in the sample. The number increased to 21 in 2004 and 23 in
2006. Publically traded ﬁrms are more likely to invest in R&D research activities (69 out of 73 total
observations of publicly trade ﬁrms have R&D investment in table 5). On average, publicly traded
agricultural ﬁrms had R&D investments more than ten times greater than their counterparts (10.4
million yuan vs. 1.14 million yuan; i.e., $1.26 million vs. $0.01 million).
We hypothesize that privatization plays an important role in R&D investment. However, it is not
easy to measure privatization. We consider two measures. First, the total number of private ﬁrms
investing in R&D reﬂects the growth of privatization. Between 2000 and 2006, the total number of
such ﬁrms more than doubled, increasing from 505 to 1355 (table 5). Second, even a privately owned
ﬁrm may be a joint venture with the state, foreign governments, or other non-private partners. Thus,
we collected information on ownership structures in the mail survey. We divided a unit’s ownership
structure into percentages held by purely private, state, foreign, and other parties. Table 5 suggests
that average state-owned shares declined from 18.6% in 2000 to 11.0% in 2006, while purely private
shares increased from 68.1% in 2000 to 79.1% in 2006.
Figure 3 shows that during 2000-2006, the distribution of private agricultural ﬁrms hardly
changed. In 2006 private agricultural ﬁrms were predominant in the food-processing industry
(43.1%), with smaller shares in the crop industry (28.1%), livestock and veterinary industries
(21.8%), and the ﬁshery industry (7.1%).Hu, et al. R&D Investment in China’s Agriculture 425
Figure 2. Proportion of Private Agricultural R&D Investment in China
Modeling Private R&D Investment
What explains this rapid rise in private research expenditure? Generally, private ﬁrms’ agricultural
R&D are modeled as investments they make to increase proﬁts. Expected returns to research
investment will improve in the presence of sizable expected demand for research products, the
strength of exclusion mechanisms such as patents which allow the ﬁrm to appropriate part
of the beneﬁts from the new product or process, and a favorable business environment that
permits proﬁtable innovations. The proﬁtability of private research also depends on technological
opportunities and research costs (David, Hall, and Toole, 2000).
The transformation of the Chinese system to a market economy has provided larger markets
for private innovations as the government has withdrawn from agricultural input markets. Markets
for agricultural inputs and food products have grown with increased demand for food products.
Appropriability has improved with the development and enforcement of intellectual property rights
legislation. Technological opportunities have grown as government research in more basic research
has grown.
A major justiﬁcation for public R&D is that it should provide positive spillovers of knowledge
that private ﬁrms can use to develop proﬁtable technologies through their own applied research.
Public agricultural development research produces commercial products that compete with private-
sector products, likely reducing private ﬁrms’ willingness to invest in R&D. Thus, more agricultural
Public-DislikelytodecreaseprivateagriculturalR&Dinvestment,andmoreagriculturalPublic-Ris
likelytoincreaseprivateagriculturalR&Dinvestment(Pray,Fuglie,andJohnson).Thesehypotheses
are supported by empirical studies using U.S. data on seed industry research (Fuglie and Walker,
2001).426 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Table 4. Firms’ R&D Investment and Characteristics in 2006





Fully state owned 103 253 114
Fully private owned 1,013 296 112
Joint equity coop 116 494 231
Joint venture 73 590 2,677
By listed company in the stock market:
Listed company 23 2,214 1,431
Non-Listed company 1,282 292 108
Total 1,305 326 132











Fully state owned 858 0.8 158 18.4
Fully private owned 1,365 1.2 80 5.9
Joint equity coop 3,549 1.5 428 12.1
Joint venture 3,851 0.1 242 6.3
By listed company in the stock market:
Listed company 12,592 0.9 706 5.6
Non-Listed company 1,462 1.3 116 7.9
Total 1,658 1.3 126 7.6
Notes: Based on a national mail survey coordinated by MOA and implemented by CCAP in 2007.
We hypothesize that ﬁrm-level private agricultural R&D investment, denoted by PARDI, is
affected by the three types of major policies discussed above and other factors, with the following
speciﬁcation:
(1) PARDIit =f(Privatizationit;Public   Rt;Public   Dt;Supportit;Xit;Z);
where the supply variables are deﬁned as follows:
1. Privatization: Four variables capture privatization and liberalization of China’s agricultural
input industry: number of private agricultural ﬁrms at the national level; two ownership
variables (share of private and foreign ownership vs. the SOE) at the ﬁrm level; and
a dummy variable reﬂecting whether a ﬁrm is publically traded or not. The number of
private agricultural ﬁrms represents the trend of agricultural market liberalization. Ownership
variables directly measure privatization.
2. Public-R and Public-D: Public R is lagged public investments on basic and basic-applied
research in plant, livestock, ﬁsheries, or food science. Public D is lagged public investment on
developmentresearchprojectinthefourareasofscience.Theoptimallaglengthisdetermined
based on information criteria.Hu, et al. R&D Investment in China’s Agriculture 427
Table 5. Summary Statistics of Key Independent Variables
Variable 2000 2004 2005 2006
No. of observations 484 1,032 1,200 1,305
No. of agricultural ﬁrms 505 1,064 1,239 1,355
No. of publicly traded ﬁrms 10 21 22 23
Public R&D (1,000,000 yuan) 128 268 352 372
(182) (350) (461) (471)
Public-R (1,000,000 yuan) 49 61 76 85
(694) (79) (94) (106)
Public-D (1,000,000 yuan) 118 267 309 345
(175) (348) (393) (438)
Government funding for private R&D research 53 104 118 126
(1,000 yuan) (391) (749) (798) (609)
Firm age (years) 5.12 6.04 6.33 6.90
(3.56) (3.87) (3.99) (4.09)
Sale revenues (1,000,000 yuan) 81 108 119 131
(245) (446) (512) (603)
Ownership
Private share (%) 68.07 76.34 78.41 79.08
(44.54) (40.31) (39.02) (38.64)
State participation (%) 18.64 12.88 11.58 11.00
(37.35) (31.83) (30.43) (29.71)
Foreign participation (%) 4.41 3.61 3.51 3.41
(17.79) (15.72) (15.55) (15.44)
Comparison between ﬁrms with zero or positive R&D investment
With zero investment With a positive investment
(n = 1,343) (n = 2,678)
Sale revenue 52.52 (196.40) 147.35 (600.64)
Age 5.75 (3.74) 6.57 (4.06)
Ownership
Private share (%) 12.81 (32.21) 12.45 (31.22)
State participation (%) 75.64 (41.19) 77.45 (39.49)
Foreign participation (%) 4.02 (16.84) 3.41 (15.32)
No. of publicly traded ﬁrms 9 67
Notes: Values above parentheses are means and inside parentheses are standard deviations.
3. Policy support: Because data on various policy supports are not available (e.g., IPR, tax
incentive, subsidized loans, and others) for private R&D investment, we include, the amount
of funding received from the government for private R&D at the ﬁrm level as an additional
variable.
4. The vector X represents all the ﬁrm’s key characteristics, including ﬁrm size as measured by
sales and age of ﬁrms; sales revenues represent each ﬁrm’s ability to invest in agricultural
R&D.
5. Vector Z represents industry and province dummy variables.
Among the total 4021 usable observations, approximately 33% (1343 observations) had no R&D
investments. A Tobit model is used to control for the high frequency of zero R&D investment.428 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Figure 3. Industry Distribution in Private Sample Firms by Year
Before presenting the detailed discussion of estimation results, we report some test results on model
speciﬁcations.
Testing for the Presence of Individual Heterogeneity
Panel estimators are similar to pooled estimators in the absence of individual heterogeneity. The
absence of individual heterogeneity is statistically equivalent to H0 :w2
m =0 (Wooldridge, 2002, p.
264). A likelihood ratio test for H0 :w2
m =0 rejects the null hypotheses at the 1% signiﬁcance level
(see the last part of table 6). Thus, a RE-Tobit estimator is more appropriate than a Tobit estimator
for our pooled data.
Testing for the Optimal Lag Length of Public R&D Investment Stock
R&D expenditures are highly correlated from year to year; for example, the correlation coefﬁcients
for Public-R, Public-D, and total public R&D investment separately from year to year in the ﬁve
year time span in our data exceed 0.9. Given such high correlations among years, it is “unlikely that
one can estimate the separate contribution with any precision” in the context of the linkage between
public R&D investment and change in productivity (p. 106 Griliches, 1979). Several analyses that
examined the relationship between public research and private R&D using U.S. and European data
use fairly short lags of 1 to 3 years, but some studies of the relationship between basic public sector
research and private research reported that lags of 6 to 8 years ﬁt best (David, Hall and Toole 2000).
The only empirical study of the relationship between public and private agricultural research that weHu, et al. R&D Investment in China’s Agriculture 429
Table 6. Estimation Results of Four Firm Random-Effects Tobit Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Privatization:
No. of private 1:842 1:799 1:793 1:748
agricultural ﬁrms (0:279) (0:279) (0:278) (0:277)
Private share 3:415 3:483 3:792 3:871
(compared w/ State) (3:22) (3:22) (3:18) (3:18)
Foreign share 0:212 0:325 0:785 0:916
(compared w/ State) (7:75) (7:76) (7:66) (7:66)
Publicly traded 7;446 7;443 7;336 7;330
company (856:7) (857:1) (847:0) (847:2)
Public R&D investment
lagged 3 years:
of the total R&D  0:001  0:001
(0:000) (0:000)
of public-R 0:017 0:018
(0:005) (0:005)
of public-D  0:004  0:004
(0:001) (0:001)
Government funding for 0:302 0:310
private R&D (0:09) (0:09)
Firm age 165:5 168:2 165:4 168:1
(29:39) (29:42) (29:05) (29:06)
Firm’s sale revenues 0:003 0:003 0:003 0:003
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Industry of the ﬁrm
(compared w/ crop)
Livestock and  546:4 381:8  558:9 394:2
veterinary (554:9) (602:3) (552:9) (600:6)
Fishery  1;214 71:6  1;239 81:5
(675:0) (750:6) (671:0) (747:3)
Process  1;975  560:0  1;982  529:9
(593:2) (694:0) (591:9) (693:4)
sigma_u 3;612 3;616 3;562 3;565
(97:0) (97:0) (96:9) (96:8)
sigma_e 2;041 2;033 2;046 2;038
(32:7) (32:6) (32:9) (32:7)
No. of observations
(ﬁrm-year pairs)
4;021 4;021 4;021 4;021
AIC 51;658 51;645 51;649 51;635
BIC 51;916 51;909 51;913 51;906
Test for sigma_u = 0
(c2(1))
1;389 1;391 1;352 1;355
p-value 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Value of AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) of test for the optimal lag length
r = 1 51;659 51;656 51;650 51;647
r = 2 51;659 51;646 51;650 51;636
r = 3 5 5 51 1 1; ; ;6 6 65 5 58 8 8 5 5 51 1 1; ; ;6 6 64 4 44 4 4 5 5 51 1 1; ; ;6 6 64 4 48 8 8 5 5 51 1 1; ; ;6 6 63 3 34 4 4
r = 4 51;659 51;646 51;649 51;638
r = 5 51;658 51;641 51;649 51;631
Notes: The single, double, and triple asterisks (*, **, ***) represent 10%, 5%, and 1% signiﬁcance levels, respectively. The province dummy
variables are included in the model estimation but not reported.430 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
are aware of was conducted by (Fuglie and Walker, 2001). Because of the nature of their data, they
use a 10-year lag for estimating the effects of public research on private research.
In this paper, we consider lags of 1 to 5 years for both Public R and Public D and checked for
the robustness of different lags. We ﬁnd that choosing different lag lengths made no difference in
the results. However, a lag of three years results in the lowest values for the Akaike information
criterion and Bayesian information criterion (see table 6). Thus, estimation results for models with
a three year lag are reported.
Table 6 summarizes estimation results of the four models. The ﬁrst two models do not include
research funds received by private ﬁrms from the government for their R&D activities as an
explanatory variable. Several privatization variables had the expected positive impacts on ﬁrms’
investments in agricultural R&D. Others did not have any impact. The coefﬁcient on number of
ﬁrms is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Whether a ﬁrm is listed on one of China’s stock
exchanges also has a statistically signiﬁcant positive impact on its R&D investment. The percentage
of government participation in ownership, percentage foreign participation, and purely private
ownership do not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on private R&D. This could be because
private shares predominate and there is little difference over time (see table 5).
As expected, ﬁrms with larger sales invest more heavily in research than smaller ﬁrms, and older
ﬁrms spend more resources on research than younger ﬁrms.
Econometric estimates of the impact of public R&D investment on private research are of
particular interest from a policy perspective. The coefﬁcients of total public R&D investments are
negative and signiﬁcant in both models 1 and 3. This indicates that although public agricultural
R&D investment increased 14.8% annually between 2000 and 2006, it did not promote increases
in private-sector R&D, but seemingly restrains increases in private agricultural R&D. However, the
negative, signiﬁcant impact is very small. Separating Public-R from Public-D provides a clearer
picture of what is going on. The coefﬁcient of the Public-R variable is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant indicating that government public research investment provides ideas, concepts, and pre-
commercial technologies that ﬁrms can use to produce proprietary technologies. The result provides
evidence of the positive impacts of public investment on private agricultural R&D investment. This
is consistent with our hypothesis that, if the government invests more in basic and basic-applied
research, the private sector will increase its R&D investments. The coefﬁcients for the Public-
D variable are negative and statistically signiﬁcant in all model speciﬁcations. The implication is
that when agricultural Public-D increases, crowd out private R&D investments. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that government investments in development research constrain private R&D
investment growth. A similar result was also reported for the US seed industry (Fuglie and Walker,
2001).
Government funding for research conducted by private ﬁrms appears to have a large, positive
impact on private-sector investments in research. This at times has partly been driven by a policy
requiring private agricultural ﬁrms to match part of the government funds with their own R&D
funds. However, because information is lacking on speciﬁc matching requirements in different
industries, provinces and research projects, we cannot determine whether government funding of
private research induces more private R&D investment than is required by the match.
Industry dummy variables do not have consistent results across model speciﬁcations. Only food
processing has a consistently negative coefﬁcient that is also signiﬁcant in speciﬁcations 2 and 4.
While not reported in table 6, the estimated results indicate that agricultural private R&D investment
differs signiﬁcantly among regions and provinces. More detailed province-level information is
needed to further analyze regional differences in agricultural private R&D investment.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper documents rapid growth in China in private-sector R&D since 2000. In 2006, private
R&D investment (3.25 billion yuan) was about 17% of total agricultural R&D (18.97 billion yuan),Hu, et al. R&D Investment in China’s Agriculture 431
a major increase over the 2000 number of 0.75 billion yuan and even smaller numbers that reported
by Pray (2002) in the 1990s.
Econometric evidence suggests that agribusiness privatization since the late 1990s was an
important determinant for the rise of private agricultural R&D, resulting in rapid growth in the
number and size of private agricultural ﬁrms and increasing the private sector’s ability to invest in
agricultural R&D. Now that most agricultural input industries have been privatized, it seems likely
that privatization will not be a major source of growth for private R&D in the future.
We also ﬁnd that whether public R&D investments displace or stimulate private R&D
investments depends on the nature of those. In particular, public R&D investments in basic and
basic-applied research increase private R&D, but public R&D investments in development research
decrease private R&D investment. In China, most public R&D investment focuses on technology
development. Basic and applied research is a small proportion of total public R&D investment,
accounting for less than 20% in 2006. Thus, the overall impact of public R&D investment has
been to restrain private R&D investment in China. Government funding provided directly to private
ﬁrms for research does increase investment by ﬁrms in private R&D. These ﬁndings indicate that
if the government wants to encourage private ﬁrms to increase their agricultural R&D investments,
the government should reduce its investments in development research, particularly in ﬁelds where
technology can be protected easily with intellectual property rights. Instead, these funds should be
invested in basic and basic-applied research or in directly funding R&D conducted by private ﬁrms.
The ﬁndings in this paper also provide lessons for other countries. Private sector R&D in
countries that are spending less on public R&D is not likely to increase unless these countries
shift their government investments in research from technology development to applied and basic
research, and, like China, have a rapidly growing agricultural input industry. The ﬁndings also
suggest that government subsidies for private research expenditure can stimulate private research,
but not in a substantial manner. For countries like Brazil and India, which are rapidly increasing
their government research expenditure, the evidence from China provides a cautionary note: rapid
expansion of technology development spending could crowd out private sector R&D. If the goal of
the governments of these countries is to increase private R&D at the same time as they are increasing
public R&D, then they should be investing resources in applied and basic agricultural R&D.
The Chinese government uses several programs to stimulate private R&D. Future research
should consider the impacts of various tax incentives and of strengthened intellectual property rights
on private-sector R&D.
[Received December 2009; ﬁnal revision received July 2011.]
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